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Abstract
Are we as a society getting more polarized, and if so, why? We try to answer this question
through a model of opinion formation. Empirical studies have shown that homophily results in
polarization. However, we show that DeGroot’s well-known model of opinion formation based
on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous.
We generalize DeGroot’s model to account for a phenomenon well-known in social psychology
as biased assimilation: when presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue,
individuals draw undue support for their initial position thereby arriving at a more extreme
opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation
process results in either polarization, persistent disagreement or consensus depending on how
biased individuals are. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not
sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides insight into the
following related question: do internet based recommender algorithms that show us personalized
content contribute to polarization? We make a connection between biased assimilation and the
polarizing effects of some random-walk based recommender algorithms that are similar in spirit
to some commonly used recommender algorithms.
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1 Introduction
The issue of polarization in society has been extensively studied and vigorously debated in the
academic literature as well as the popular press over the last few decades. In particular, are we
as a society getting more polarized, if so, why, and how can we fix it? Different empirical studies
arrive at different answers to this question depending on the context and the metric used to measure
polarization.
Evidence of polarization in politics has been found in the increasingly partisan voting patterns
of the members of Congress [PR84, PR91] and in the extreme policies adopted by candidates for
political office [Hil09]. McCarty et al. [MPR06] claim via rigorous analysis that America is polarized
in terms of political attitudes and beliefs. Phenomena such as segregation in urban residential
neighborhoods ([Sch71, BM06, BIKK12]), the rising popularity of overtly partisan television news
networks [Bil09, Bil10], and the readership and linking patterns of blogs along partisan lines [AG05,
HG07, GBK09, LSF10] can all be viewed as further evidence of polarization. On the other hand,
it has also been argued on the basis of detailed surveys of public opinion that society as a whole
is not polarized, even though the media and the politicians make it seem so [Wol99, FAP05]. We
adopt the view that polarization is not a property of a state of society; instead it is a property of
the dynamics of interaction between individuals.
It has been argued that homophily, i.e., greater interaction with like-minded individuals, results
in polarization [BHK+96, Sun02, GBK09]. Evidence in support of this argument has been used
to claim that the rise of cable news, talk radio and the Internet has contributed to polarization:
the increased diversity of information sources coupled with the increased ability to narrowly tailor
them to one’s specific tastes (either manually or algorithmically through, for example, recommender
systems) has an echo-chamber effect which ultimately results in increased polarization.
A rich body of work attempts to explain polarization through variants of a well-known opinion
formation model due to DeGroot [DeG74]. In DeGroot’s model, individuals are connected to each
other in a social network. The edges of the network have associated weights representing the
extent to which neighbors influence each other’s opinions. Individuals update their opinion as a
weighted average of their current opinion and that of their neighbors. Variants of this model (e.g.,
[FJ90, Kra00, ACFO10, BKO11]) account for the empirical observation that in many cases there is
persistent disagreement between individuals and consensus is never reached. However, we show that
repeated averaging of opinions, which underlies these models, always results in opinions that are
less divergent compared to the initial opinions, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. As
a result, this entire body of work appears to fall short of explaining polarization which is generally
perceived to mean an increased divergence of opinions, not just persistent disagreement. In this
paper, we seek a more satisfactory model of opinion formation that (a) is informed by a theory of
how individuals actually form opinions, and (b) produces an increased divergence of opinions under
intuitive conditions.
We base our model on a well-known phenomenon in social psychology called biased assimilation,
according to which individuals process new information in a biased manner whereby they readily
accept confirming evidence while critically examining disconfirming evidence. Suppose that indi-
viduals with opposing views on an issue are shown mixed or inconclusive evidence. Intuitively,
exposure to such evidence would engender greater agreement, or at least a moderation of views.
However, in a seminal paper, Lord et al. [LRL79] showed through experiments that biased as-
similation causes individuals to arrive at more extreme opinions after being exposed to identical,
inconclusive evidence. This finding has been reproduced in many different settings over the years
(e.g., [MMBD93, MDL+02, TL06]). We use biased assimilation as the basis of our model of opinion
formation and show that in our model homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient
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to polarize society.
1.1 Summary of Contributions
We propose a generalization of DeGroot’s model that accounts for biased assimilation. Like De-
Groot’s model, our opinion formation process unfolds over an exogenously defined social network
represented by a weighted undirected graph G = (V,E). Each individual i ∈ V has an opinion
xi(t) ∈ [0, 1], which represents his degree of support at time step t for the position represented by
1. In order to weight confirming evidence more heavily relative to disconfirming evidence, opinions
are updated as follows: individual i weights each neighbor j’s opinion xj(t) by a factor (xi(t))
bi
and weights the opposing view (1 − xj(t)) by a factor (1 − xi(t))bi , where bi ≥ 0 is a bias pa-
rameter. Informally, bi represents the bias with which i assimilates his neighbors opinions. When
bi = 0, our model reduces to DeGroot’s, and corresponds to unbiased assimilation. Our biased
opinion formation process mathematically reproduces the effect empirically observed by Lord et al.
(Theorem 1).
We measure divergence of opinions in terms of the network disagreement index (NDI), which we
define to be
∑
(i,j)∈E wij(xi(t)− xj(t))2. It is similar to the notion of social cost used by Bindel et
al. [BKO11]. We say that an opinion formation process is polarizing if the NDI at the end of the
process is greater than that initially. We show that:
• (Theorem 2) DeGroot-like repeated averaging processes can never be polarizing, even if indi-
viduals are arbitrarily homophilous (i.e., the underlying network is presented adversarially as
opposed to based on a mathematical model).
• (Theorem 4) The biased opinion formation process over a simple model of networks with
homophily results in polarization if individuals’ bias parameter b ≥ 1. If b < 1, the process
results in either persistent disagreement or consensus depending on the degree of homophily.
In summary, we show that homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize
society. This conclusion disagrees with the literature (e.g., [BHK+96, Sun02]) that proposes ho-
mophily as the predominant cause of polarization. As the reader might expect, there are many ways
of mathematically measuring the divergence of opinions among individuals. Many of our results
hold for more general measures of divergence, which we discuss in Section 6.
The notion of biased assimilation also provides insight into the following related question: do
internet based recommender algorithms that show us personalized content contribute to polariza-
tion? We analyze the polarizing effects of three recommender algorithms—SimpleSALSA, Sim-
plePPR, and SimpleICF—that are similar in spirit to three well-known algorithms from the litera-
ture: SALSA [LM01], Personalized PageRank [PBMW99], and Item-based Collaborative Filtering
[LSY03]. For a simple, natural model of the underlying user-item graph, and under reasonable
assumptions, we show that SimplePPR, which recommends the item that is most relevant to a user
based on a PageRank-like score, is always polarizing (Theorem 5). On the other hand, Simple-
SALSA and SimpleICF, which first choose a random item liked by the user and recommend an
item similar to that item, are polarizing only if individuals are biased (Theorem 6). Designing
algorithms and online social systems that reduce polarization, for example, by counteracting biased
assimilation is a promising research direction.
2 Model
Our opinion formation process unfolds over a social network represented by a connected weighted
undirected graph G = (V,E,w). The nodes in V represent individuals and the edges represent
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friendships or relationships between them. Let |V | = n. An edge (i, j) ∈ E is associated with a
weight wij > 0 representing the degree of influence i and j have on each other. Each individual i ∈ V
also has an associated weight wii ≥ 0 representing the degree to which the individual weights his
own opinions. We will denote by N(i) the set of neighbors of i, that is, N(i) := {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E}.
An individual i has an opinion xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] at time step t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The extreme opinions 0
and 1 represent two opposing points of view on an issue. So xi(t) can be interpreted as individual
i’s degree of support at time t for the position represented by 1, and 1 − xi(t) as the degree of
support for the position represented by 0. Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1]n denote the vector of opinions at time t.
An opinion formation process is simply a description of how individuals update their opinions, i.e.,
for each individual i ∈ V , it defines xi(t+ 1) as a function of the vector of opinions, x(t), at time t.
2.1 Measuring Polarization
We view polarization as a property of an opinion formation process instead of a property of a state
of the network. We characterize polarization as a verb as opposed to a noun, i.e., we say that an
opinion formation process is polarizing if it results in an increased divergence of opinions. One could
mathematically capture divergence of opinions in many different ways. We measure divergence in
terms of the network disagreement index defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Network Disagreement Index (NDI)). Given a graph G = (V,E,w) and a vector
of opinions x ∈ [0, 1]n of individuals in V , the network disagreement index η(G,x) is defined as
η(G,x) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij(xi − xj)2 (2.1)
Consider an opinion formation process over a network G = (V,E,w) that transforms a set of
initial opinions x ∈ [0, 1]n into a set of opinions x′ ∈ [0, 1]n. Then, we say the process is polarizing
if η(G,x′) > η(G,x), and vice versa.
The NDI is similar to the notion of social cost used by Bindel et al. [BKO11]. Each term wij(xi−
xj)
2 can be viewed as the cost of disagreement imposed upon i and j. This view that the social cost
depends on the magnitude of the difference of opinions along edges is consistent with theories in
social psychology according to which attitude conflicts in relationships are a source of psychological
stress or instability [Hei46, Fes57]. The NDI captures the phenomenon of issue radicalization,
i.e., pre-existing groups of individuals becoming progressively more extreme. Admittedly, it does
not entirely capture an aspect of polarization called issue alignment [BG08] whereby individuals
with diverse opinions organize into ideologically coherent, but opposing factions. However, there
is significant empirical evidence [MPR06, BG08, Cas12] that issue radicalization is more prevalent
compared to issue alignment, and hence NDI captures the most salient aspects of polarization.
Many of our results hold for more general measures of divergence which we discuss in Section 6.
2.2 DeGroot’s Repeated Averaging Model
In his seminal work on opinion formation, DeGroot [DeG74] proposed a model where at each time
step, individuals simultaneously update their opinion to the weighted average of their neighbors’
and their own opinion at the previous time step.
Definition 2.2 (DeGroot’s Repeated Averaging Process). The opinion of individual i at time t+1,
xi(t+ 1), is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) + si(t)
wii + di
(2.2)
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where si(t) :=
∑
j∈N(i)wijxj(t) is the weighted sum of the opinions of i’s neighbors, and di :=∑
j∈N(i)wij is i’s weighted degree.
Recall that xj(t) and 1−xj(t) represent the degree of support for extremes 1 and 0, respectively.
Then, opinion update under DeGroot’s process is equivalent to taking a weighted average of the
total support for 0 and that for 1. The weight that individual i places on 1 (and on 0) is computed
by summing the degrees of support of i’s neighbors weighted by the influence of each neighbor on i.
2.3 Biased Opinion Formation Model
We generalize DeGroot’s model to account for biased assimilation. Biased assimilation is a well-
known phenomenon in social psychology described by Lord et al. [LRL79] in their seminal paper
as follows:
People who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant empirical
evidence in a biased manner. They are apt to accept “confirming” evidence at face value while
subjecting “disconfirming” evidence to critical evaluation, and as a result to draw undue support
for their initial positions from mixed or random empirical findings.
Lord et al. [LRL79] showed through experiments that biased assimilation of mixed or inconclusive
evidence does indeed result in more extreme opinions.
In order to account for biased assimilation, we propose a biased opinion formation process. Recall
that xi(t) can be viewed as the degree of support for the position represented by 1. Individuals weight
confirming evidence more heavily relative to disconfirming evidence by updating their opinions as
follows: individual i weights each neighbor j’s support for 1 (i.e., xj(t)) by an additional factor
(xi(t))
bi , where bi ≥ 0 is a bias parameter. Therefore, xi(t + 1) ∝ (xi(t))biwijxj(t), Similarly, i
weights j’s support for 0 (i.e., 1−xj(t)) by (1−xi(t))bi , and so (1−xi(t+ 1)) ∝ (1−xi(t))biwij(1−
xj(t)). Informally, bi represents the bias with which i assimilates his neighbors opinions.
Illustrative example. Consider a graph with two nodes, i and j, connected by an edge with
a weight wij . Then, according to the biased opinion formation process, i’s opinion at time t + 1,
xi(t+ 1), is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) + (xi(t))
biwijxj(t)
wii + (xi(t))biwijxj(t) + (1− xi(t))biwij(1− xj(t))
More generally, the opinion update of individual i in the biased opinion formation process is defined
as below.
Definition 2.3 (Biased Opinion Formation Process). Under the biased opinion formation process,
the opinion of individual i at time t+ 1, xi(t+ 1), is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) + (xi(t))
bisi(t)
wii + (xi(t))bisi(t) + (1− xi(t))bi(di − si(t)) (2.3)
where, as before, si(t) :=
∑
j∈N(i)wijxj(t) is the weighted sum of the opinions of i’s neighbors,
and di :=
∑
j∈N(i)wij is i’s weighted degree. Observe that when bi = 0, (2.3) is identical to
(2.2), i.e., DeGroot’s averaging process is a special case of our process and corresponds to unbiased
assimilation. More generally, biased assimilation can be modeled by making i’s opinion update
proportional to βi(xi(t))si(t), where the bias function βi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is non-decreasing.
Connection with Urn Models. Urn models are an elegant abstraction that have been used
to analyze the properties of a wide variety of probabilistic processes. DeGroot’s model of weighted
averaging has the following analogous urn dynamic: xi(t) denotes the fraction of RED balls in
5
individual i’s urn at time t, and 1− xi(t) denotes the corresponding fraction of BLUE balls. At each
time step, i chooses a neighbor j with probability proportional to wij and chooses a ball uniformly
at random from j’s urn. Individual i adds that ball to his urn and discards a ball chosen uniformly
at random from his urn. When the bias parameter bi = 1, the biased opinion formation process can
be interpreted as the following variant of the above urn dynamic: as before, i chooses a neighbor
j with probability proportional to wij and chooses a ball uniformly at random from j’s urn. In
addition, i also chooses a ball uniformly at random from his own urn. If the colors of the two balls
match, i puts them both into his urn and discards a ball chosen uniformly at random from his urn.
If the colors do not match, the two balls are returned to their respective urns.
2.4 Biased Assimilation by a Single Agent in a Fixed Environment
Here we demonstrate that our model of biased assimilation mathematically reproduces the empirical
findings of Lord et al. [LRL79]. We analyze the change in opinion of a single individual as a
function of his bias parameter when he is exposed to opinions from a fixed environment. The fixed
environment represents sources of information that influence the individual’s opinion, but can be
assumed to remain unaffected by the individual’s opinion, such as the news media, the Internet, the
organizations that the individual is a part of, etc.
For this section, we will denote by x(t) ∈ [0, 1] the individual’s opinion at time t, and by
b ≥ 0 the individual’s bias parameter. Let the individual’s weight on his own opinion, wii = w.
Let s ∈ (0, 1) denote the (time-invariant) weighted average of the opinions of all sources in the
individual’s environment. Then, from (2.3), the individual’s opinion at time t+ 1 is given by
x(t+ 1) =
wx(t) + (x(t))bs
w + (x(t))bs+ (1− x(t))b(1− s) (2.4)
Given s ∈ (0, 1), and b 6= 1, we define
xˆ(s, b) :=
s1/(1−b)
s1/(1−b) + (1− s)1/(1−b) (2.5)
as the polarization threshold for the individual. We show that when the individual is sufficiently
biased (i.e., b > 1), the polarization threshold xˆ is an unstable equilibrium, i.e., in equilibrium the
individual’s opinion goes to 1 or 0 depending on whether the initial opinion was greater than or less
than xˆ. On the other hand, when b < 1, xˆ is a stable equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Fix t ≥ 0. Let x(t) ∈ (0, 1).
1. If b > 1,
(a) if x(t) > xˆ, then x(t+ 1) > x(t), and x(t)→ 1 as t→∞.
(b) if x(t) < xˆ, then x(t+ 1) < x(t), and x(t)→ 0 as t→∞.
(c) if x(t) = xˆ, then for all t′ > t, x(t′) = xˆ.
2. If b < 1,
(a) if x(t) > xˆ, then x(t+ 1) < x(t).
(b) if x(t) < xˆ, then x(t+ 1) > x(t).
(c) x(t)→ xˆ as t→∞.
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The theorem is proved in Appendix A. The opinion x(t) can be interpreted as the individual’s
degree of support for the extreme represented by 1. So, the above theorem shows that when the
individual is sufficiently biased (i.e., b > 1), exposure to the environment pushes him away from
the threshold xˆ (unless x(0) = xˆ), and toward one of the extremes, and the individual holds an
extreme opinion (x(t) = 0 or x(t) = 1) in equilibrium. Thus xˆ is an unstable equilibrium. This
mathematically captures the biased assimilation behavior observed empirically. On the other hand,
if the individual has low bias (i.e., b < 1), then he gravitates towards the polarization threshold xˆ
over time. Thus, xˆ is a stable equilibrium in this case. The behavior of the individual when b = 1
is a limiting case of the two cases proven in the theorem; as b→ 1, xˆ→ s. When the individual is
connected to other individuals in a social network, we will show that the biased opinion formation
process produces polarization even when b = 1.
3 DeGroot’s Repeated Averaging Process is not Polarizing
It is easy to see that if DeGroot’s process was asynchronous, i.e., individuals update their opinion
one at a time, each opinion update can only lower the network disagreement index (NDI). However,
here we will show that each opinion update can only lower the NDI even when individuals update
opinions simultaneously. As a result, the repeated averaging process is depolarizing. Our result
holds for arbitrary weights wij , and an arbitrary vector of opinions x ∈ [0, 1]n, i.e., when the
underlying network is arbitrarily homophilous.
Theorem 2. Consider an arbitrary weighted undirected graph G = (V,E,w). Assume that G is
connected. Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1]n be an arbitrary vector of opinions of nodes in G at time t ≥ 0. Assume
that for all i ∈ V, bi = 0. Then, η(G,x(t+ 1)) ≤ η(G,x(t)), i.e., the network disagreement index at
time t+ 1 is no more than that at time t.
The theorem is proved in Appendix B. Observe that in the limit as wii → ∞, individual i can
be viewed as being a zealot [YAO+11],i.e., an individual with an unchanging opinion. So our result
also holds for repeated averaging in the presence of zealots.
A possible criticism of this result is that it holds for this particular definition of the NDI which
may not always capture the intuitive notion of polarization. For example, consider a network
partitioned into two densely connected opposing factions with sparse cross linkages. One might
consider such a network to be polarized, even though the network disagreement index for it is
small. An alternate measure that does capture the divergence of opinions in the above example is
the global disagreement index (GDI) defined below.
Definition 3.1 (Global Disagreement Index (GDI)). Given a vector of opinions x ∈ [0, 1]n of
individuals in V , the global disagreement index γ(x) is defined as
γ(x) :=
∑
i<j
(xi − xj)2 (3.1)
Observe that it is possible to assign edge weights wij such that DeGroot’s repeated averaging
process increases the GDI since the latter is independent of the weights. However, we show that a
variant of repeated averaging, based on the well-known flocking model for decentralized consensus
[Tsi84], can only decrease the GDI. We consider a repeated averaging process where at each time
step t ≥ 0, an arbitrary set S(t) ⊆ V of individuals simultaneously updates their opinions to be
closer to the average opinion of the set.
7
Definition 3.2 (Flocking Process). Let  ∈ [0, 1]. For t ≥ 0, let S(t) ⊆ V be an arbitrary set of
individuals. Let s(t) := 1|S(t)|
∑
i∈S(t) xi(t) be the average opinions of individuals in S(t). Under the
flocking process, the opinion of individual i ∈ V at time t+ 1, xi(t+ 1), is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
{
(1− )xi(t) + s(t), if i ∈ S(t)
xi(t), otherwise
(3.2)
Next we show that each opinion update in the flocking process can only lower the GDI.
Theorem 3. Let x(t) ∈ [0, 1]n be an arbitrary vector of opinions of nodes in V at time t ≥ 0. Let
x(t+ 1) ∈ [0, 1]n be the vector of opinions at time t+ 1 after one step of the flocking process. Then,
γ(x(t+ 1)) ≤ γ(x(t)), i.e., the GDI at time t+ 1 is no more than that at time t.
The theorem is proved in Appendix B.
4 Polarization due to Biased Assimilation
In this section we state and prove our main result: in a simple model of networks with homophily,
the biased opinion formation process may result in either polarization, persistent disagreement, or
consensus depending on how biased the individuals are. We model homophilous networks using a
deterministic variant of multi-type random networks [GJ11]. Multi-type random networks are a gen-
eralization of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs. Nodes in V are partitioned into types, say, τ1, τ2, . . . , τk.
The network is parameterized by a vector (n1, . . . , nk) where ni is the number of nodes of type τi,
and a symmetric matrix P ∈ [0, 1]k×k, where Pij is the probability that there exists an undirected
edge between a node of type τi and another of type τj . The class of multi-type random networks
where Pii > Pij for all i, j, is called is the islands model, and is used to model homophily (since an
individual is more likely to be connected with individuals of the same type). We will analyze the
biased opinion formation process over a deterministic variant of the islands model, which we call a
two-island network.
Definition 4.1. Given integers n1, n2 ≥ 0, and real numbers ps, pd ∈ (0, 1), a (n1, n2, ps, pd)-two
island network is a weighted undirected graph G = (V1, V2, E, w) where
• |V1| = n1, |V2| = n2 and V1 ∩ V2 = ∅.
• Each node i ∈ V1 has n1ps neighbors in V1 and n2pd neighbors in V2.
• Each node i ∈ V2 has n2ps neighbors in V2 and n1pd neighbors in V11.
• ps > pd.
For a two-island network, we define the degree of homophily as follows.
Definition 4.2. Let G = (V1, V2, E, w) be a (n1, n2, ps, pd)-two island network. Then the degree of
homophily in G, hG, is defined to be the ratio ps/pd.
Informally, a high value of hG implies that nodes in V are much more likely to form edges to
other nodes of their own type, thereby exhibiting a high degree of homophily.
Theorem 4. Let G = (V1, V2, E, w) be a (n, n, ps, pd)-two island network. For all i ∈ V = V1 ∪ V2,
let wii = 0. For all (i, j) ∈ E, let wij = 1. Assume for all i ∈ V1, xi(0) = x0 where 12 < x0 < 1.
Assume for all i ∈ V2, xi(0) = 1− x0. Assume for all i ∈ V , the bias parameter bi = b > 0. Then,
1For clarity of exposition, we assume that the quantities n1ps, n2ps, n1pd and n2pd are all integers.
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Algorithm 1 SimpleSALSA
Input: G = (V1, V2, E), node i ∈ V1.
Perform a three-step random walk on G starting at i.
Let the random walk end at node j ∈ V2.
Output: j.
1. (Polarization) If b ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ V1, limt→∞ xi(t) = 1, and ∀i ∈ V2, limt→∞ xi(t) = 0.
2. (Persistent Disagreement) if 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , then there exists a unique xˆ ∈ (12 , 1) such that∀i ∈ V1, limt→∞ xi(t) = xˆ, and ∀i ∈ V2, limt→∞ xi(t) = 1− xˆ.
3. (Consensus) if b < 2hG+1 , then for all i ∈ V, limt→∞ xi(t) = 12 .
The theorem is proved in Appendix C. Let us analyze the implications of this theorem. Let
η(G,x(t))→ η∞ as t→∞, i.e., let η∞ be the NDI at equilibrium. Then, the above result implies
that when b ≥ 1, η∞ > η(G,x(0)), i.e., the biased opinion formation process is polarizing. On the
other hand, when individuals are moderately biased (i.e., 1 > b ≥ 2/(hG + 1)), η∞ > η(G,x(0))
if and only if x0 < xˆ; so the opinion formation process may not be polarizing, but it doesn’t
produce consensus either. Finally, when individuals have low bias (i.e., b < 2/(hG + 1), η∞ = 0 <
η(G,x(0)), i.e., the opinion formation process is depolarizing, since the network reaches consensus
in equilibrium.
This illustrates the importance of the bias parameter in causing polarization. Also, observe that
b = 1 corresponds to the urn dynamic described in Section 2.3, and hence the above result shows
that that urn dynamic causes polarization for arbitrarily small degree of homophily.
5 Recommender Systems and Polarization
Recommender systems are widely used on the Internet to present personalized information (e.g.,
search results, new articles, products) to individuals. This personalization is typically done by
algorithms that use an individual’s the past behavior (e.g., history of browsing and purchases) and of
other individuals that are similar in some way to that individual, to discover items of possible interest
to the user. It has been argued [Sun02] that this personalization of information has an echo-chamber
effect where individuals are only exposed to information they agree with, and this ultimately leads
to increased polarization. In this section we investigate this question: do recommender systems
have a polarizing effect? We analyze three simple random-walk based recommender algorithms—
SimpleSALSA (Algorithm 1), SimplePPR (Algorithm 2) and SimpleICF(Algorithm 3)— that are
similar in spirit to three well-known recommender algorithms from the literature: SALSA [LM01],
Personalized PageRank [PBMW99], and item-based collaborative filtering [LSY03], respectively.
We consider the following simple model: Let G = (V1, V2, E) be an unweighted undirected
bipartite graph. Nodes in V1 represent individuals. Nodes in V2 represent items. The items could
be books, webpages, news articles, products, etc. For concreteness, we will refer to nodes in V2 as
books. For a node i ∈ V1 and a node j ∈ V2, an edge (i, j) ∈ E represents ownership, i.e., individual
i owns book j. For our purpose, we define a recommender algorithm as below.
Definition 5.1. A recommender algorithm takes as input a bipartite graph G = (V1, V2, E) and a
node i ∈ V1, and outputs a node j ∈ V2.
Thus, given a graph representing which users own which books, and a specific user i, a recom-
mender algorithm outputs a single book j to be recommended to i. We assume that i can only buy
9
Algorithm 2 SimplePPR
Input: G = (V1, V2, E), node i ∈ V1.
Parameter: A large positive integer T .
Perform T three-step random walks on G starting at node i.
For node j ∈ V2, let count(j) be the number of random walks that end at node j.
Output: j∗ := arg maxj count(j).
a book if it is recommended to him. However, he may choose to reject a recommendation, i.e., to
not buy a recommended book. Therefore, i buying a book j requires two steps: the recommender
algorithm must recommend j to i, and then i must accept the recommendation.
Since, we are interested in analyzing the polarizing effects of recommender systems, we will
assume that each book in V2 is labeled either ‘RED’ or ‘BLUE’. These labels are purely for the purpose
of analysis; the algorithms we study are agnostic to these labels. For each individual i ∈ V1, let
xi ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of RED books owned by i, and 1− xi be that of BLUE books. Individuals
may be biased, or unbiased, as we define below.
Definition 5.2. Consider a book recommended to an individual i ∈ V1. We say that i is unbiased
if i accepts the recommendation with the same probability independent of whether the book is RED or
BLUE. We say that i is biased if
1. i accepts the recommendation of a RED book with probability xi, and rejects it with probability
1− xi, and
2. i accepts the recommendation of a BLUE book with probability 1− xi, and rejects it with prob-
ability xi.
Observe that the above definition of an individual i being biased corresponds to the urn dynamic
described in Section 2.3 with bi = 1. For an individual i, the fraction of RED books i owns, xi, can
be viewed as i’s opinion in the interval [0, 1], and so a recommender algorithm can be viewed as
an opinion formation process. The opinion xi remains unchanged if i rejects a recommendation.
However, if i accepts a recommendation, xi increases or decreases depending on whether the recom-
mended book was RED or BLUE. Thus, we are interested in the probability that a recommendation
was for a RED (or BLUE) book given that i accepted the recommendation. The above probability
determines whether a recommender algorithm is polarizing or not.
Definition 5.3. Consider a recommender algorithm and an individual i ∈ V1 that accepts the
algorithm’s recommendation. The algorithm is polarizing with respect to i if
1. when xi >
1
2 , the probability that the recommended book was RED is greater than xi, and
2. when xi <
1
2 , the probability that the recommended book was RED is less than xi.
In order to analyze the recommender algorithms, we assume a generative model for G, which
we describe next.
5.1 Generative Model for G
Let the number of individuals, |V1| = m > 0. Let the number of books, |V2| = 2n, with n > 0 books
of each color. We assume that m = f(n); and limn→∞ f(n) = ∞. For each individual i ∈ V1, we
draw xi independently from a distribution over [0, 1] with a probability density function (pdf) g(·).
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Algorithm 3 SimpleICF
Input: G = (V1, V2, E), node i ∈ V1.
Parameter: A large positive integer T .
Choose a neighbor k of i uniformly at random.
Perform T two-step random walks on G starting at k.
For node j ∈ V2, let count(j) be the number of random walks that end at node j.
Output: j∗ := arg maxj count(j).
We assume that g is symmetric about 12 , i.e., for all y ∈ [0, 1], g(y) = g(1 − y). This implies that
for all i ∈ V1, E[xi] = 12 . We assume that the variance of the distribution is strictly positive, i.e.,
Var(xi) > 0. For an individual i and a RED book j, there exists an edge (i, j) ∈ E independently
with probability xikn , where 0 < k < n. For an individual i and a BLUE book j, there exists an
edge (i, j) ∈ E independently with probability (1−xi)kn . So, in expectation, each individual i owns k
books, and xi fraction of them are RED.
For two books j, j′ ∈ V2, let Mjj′ := |N(j) ∩N(j′)| be the number of individuals in V1 that are
neighbors of both j and j′ in G. For any two nodes i, j ∈ V , let P[i `−→ j] be the probability that a
`-step random walk over G starting at i ends at j. For a node i ∈ V1 and a node j ∈ V2, let Zij be
the indicator variable for edge (i, j),i.e., Zij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, and Zij = 0 otherwise.
5.2 Analysis
Next we prove our results about the polarizing effects of each of the three algorithms. Our results
hold with probability 1 in the limit as n → ∞. First we invoke the Strong Law of Large Numbers
to show that the random quantities we care about all take their expected values with probability 1
as n→∞.
Lemma 5.1. In the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
(a) for all i ∈ V1, |N(i)| → k,
(b) for all i ∈ V1,
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1 → xik,
(c) for all i ∈ V1,
∑
j1∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij2 → (1− xi)k,
(d) for all j ∈ V2, |N(j)| → mk2n ,
(e) for every pair of RED books j, j′ ∈ V2,Mjj′ =
∑
i∈V1 ZijZij′ →
mk2( 1
4
+Var(x1))
n2
,
(f) for every pair of BLUE books j, j′ ∈ V2,Mjj′ =
∑
i∈V1 ZijZij′ →
mk2( 1
4
+Var(x1))
n2
, and
(g) for every RED book j and every BLUE book j′, Mjj′ =
∑
i∈V1 ZijZij′ →
mk2( 1
4
−Var(x1))
n2
.
Proof. Recall that as n → ∞, m = f(n) → ∞. So statements (a) through (g) follow from the
Strong Law of Large Numbers.
We use Lemma 5.1 to prove our results. First we show that SimplePPR (Algorithm 2) is
polarizing with respect to i even if i is unbiased.
Theorem 5. In the limit as n→∞ and as T →∞, SimplePPR is polarizing with respect to i.
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Next we show that SimpleSALSA and SimpleICF are polarizing only if i is biased.
Theorem 6. In the limit as n→∞,
1. SimpleSALSA is polarizing with respect to i if and only if i is biased.
2. In the limit as T →∞, SimpleICF is polarizing with respect to i if and only if i is biased.
Both Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are proved in Appendix D.
6 Discussion of Various Measures of Opinion Divergence
Recall that we define an opinion formation process to be polarizing if it results in an increased
divergence of opinions. Here we describe a number of alternate measures of divergence, and discuss
how many of our results hold for these measures. A generalization of the global disagreement index
(GDI) is the following:
∑
i<j h(|xi − xj |), where h is an arbitrary convex function. The flocking
process has the property that the vector x(t + 1) is majorized by x(t). Therefore, as noted in the
proof of Theorem 3, each opinion update of the flocking process is depolarizing under this definition,
or more generally, when divergence is defined by any symmetric convex function of x.
A stronger definition of divergence is one based on second order stochastic dominance, which is
defined over distributions, but can be easily modified to work with vectors. Informally, a distribution
F is second order stochastically dominated by a distribution G if F is a mean-preserving spread of G.
Let us say an opinion formation process is polarizing if the final opinion vector is dominated (second
order stochastically) by the initial opinion vector, and is depolarizing if the final vector dominates
the initial vector. According to this definition, a single opinion update in the DeGroot and flocking
processes is in general neither polarizing nor depolarizing. However, both these processes have been
shown to converge to consensus under fairly general conditions ([DeG74, Tsi84]). Thus, under those
conditions, both these processes are depolarizing in equilibrium. Moreover, our results on the three
recommender algorithms (Theorem 5 and Theorem 6) also hold under this definition of divergence.
Consider the following even stronger definition of polarization: a process is polarizing if at each
time step, it pushes the opinions of individuals away from the average and is depolarizing if it brings
their opinions closer to the average. Under this definition too, the DeGroot and flocking processes
are neither polarizing nor depolarizing. However, under all three definitions, the biased opinion
formation process is polarizing on a two-island network when b ≥ 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we attempted to explain polarization in society through a model of opinion formation.
We generalized DeGroot’s repeated averaging model to account for biased assimilation. We showed
that DeGroot-like repeated averaging processes can never be polarizing, even if individuals are
arbitrarily homophilous. We also showed that in a two-island network, our biased opinion formation
process may result in either polarization (if b ≥ 1), persistent disagreement (if 1 > b ≥ 2/(h+ 1)),
or consensus (if b < 2/(h + 1)). In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is
not sufficient to polarize society. We used biased assimilation to provide insight into the polarizing
effects of three recommender algorithms: SimpleSALSA, SimplePPR and SimpleICF. We showed
that for a simple, natural model of the underlying user-item graph, SimpleSALSA and SimpleICF
are polarizing only if individuals are biased whereas SimplePPR is polarizing even if individuals are
unbiased.
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One direction for further investigation is to study through human subject experiments how the
degree of homophily and the strength of biased assimilation affect whether individuals interacting
over a network polarize or arrive at a consensus? Our analysis of recommender algorithms is
a first step toward designing algorithms and online social systems that counteract polarization
and facilitate greater consensus between individuals over complex and vexing social, economic and
political issues. We view this as a promising and important direction for further research.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that
x(t+ 1) :=
wx(t) + (x(t))bs
w + (x(t))bs+ (1− x(t))b(1− s)
Equivalently,
x(t+ 1)
1− x(t+ 1) =
wx(t) + (x(t))bs
w(1− x(t)) + (1− x(t))b(1− s) =
w + (x(t))b−1s
w + (1− x(t))b−1(1− s)
x(t)
1− x(t) (A.1)
First we will show that if x(t) = xˆ, then for all t′ > t, x(t′) = xˆ.
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Lemma A.1. Assume b 6= 1. Fix t ≥ 0. Let x(t) = xˆ. Then for all t′ > t, x(t′) = xˆ.
Proof. To prove the lemma, it suffices to show that x(t+ 1) = x(t) = xˆ. Recall that
xˆ :=
s1/(1−b)
s1/(1−b) + (1− s)1/(1−b)
Or equivalently, (
xˆ
1− xˆ
)1−b
=
s
1− s
This implies that when x(t) = xˆ, x(t)b−1s = (1− x(t))b−1(1− s). Substituting this in (A.1), we get
that
x(t+ 1)
1− x(t+ 1) =
x(t)
1− x(t)
Or equivalently, x(t+ 1) = x(t).
Next we will show that when b > 1, xˆ is an unstable equilibrium.
Lemma A.2. Let b > 1. Fix t ≥ 0.
1. If x(t) > xˆ, then x(t+ 1) > x(t).
2. If x(t) < xˆ, then x(t+ 1) < x(t).
Proof. Again, recall that (
xˆ
1− xˆ
)1−b
=
s
1− s
Therefore, if x(t) > xˆ, it implies that
x(t)
1− x(t) >
xˆ
1− xˆ ⇒
(
x(t)
1− x(t)
)1−b
<
(
xˆ
1− xˆ
)1−b
=
s
1− s (since b > 1)
Or equivalently, (x(t))b−1s > (1− x(t))b−1(1− s). Substituting this in (A.1), we get that
x(t+ 1)
1− x(t+ 1) >
x(t)
1− x(t)
Or equivalently, x(t+ 1) > x(t).
By a similar argument, if x(t) < xˆ, then(x(t))b−1s < (1 − x(t))b−1(1 − s). Again, substituting
this in (A.1), we get that
x(t+ 1)
1− x(t+ 1) <
x(t)
1− x(t)
Or equivalently, x(t+ 1) < x(t).
Next we will show that when b > 1, either limt→∞ x(t) = 1 or limt→∞ x(t) = 0.
Lemma A.3. Let b > 1. Fix t ≥ 0.
1. If x(t) > xˆ, then limt→∞ x(t) = 1.
2. If x(t) < xˆ, then limt→∞ x(t) = 0.
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Proof. For the proof, we will assume that x(t) > xˆ and show that limt→∞ x(t) = 1. The case when
x(t) < xˆ can be argued in an analogous way.
By definition, we know that for all t ≥ 0, x(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Further, from Lemma A.2, we know
that the sequence {x(t′)t′≥t} is strictly increasing. Since the sequence is strictly increasing and
bounded, it must converge either to 1 or to some value in the interval [x(t), 1). Consider the
function g : [0, 1]→ R defined as
g(y) :=
w + ybs
w + ybs+ (1− y)b(1− s) − y
Observe that for all t ≥ 0, x(t+ 1)− x(t) = g(x(t)). Therefore,
(a) for all y ∈ [x(t), 1), g(y) > 0 (since, by Lemma A.2, the sequence {x(t′)t′→t} is strictly increas-
ing), and
(b) g(1) = 0.
For the purpose of contradiction, assume that limt→∞ x(t) = a, where x(t) ≤ a < 1. This implies,
for every  > 0, there exists a t() such that for all t′ ≥ t(), x(t′ + 1) − x(t′) < , or equivalently,
that for all t′ ≥ t(), g(x(t′)) < .
Let miny∈[x(t),a] g(y) = c. It implies for all y ∈ [x(t), a], g(y) ≥ c. From (a), it follows that c > 0.
Setting  = c, our analysis implies the following two properties of g: (1) for all t ≥ 0, g(x(t)) ≥ c,
and (2) for all t′ ≥ t(), g(x(t′)) < c, which contradict each other. This completes the proof by
contradiction.
Using a similar argument we can show that when b < 1, xˆ is a stable equilibrium.
Lemma A.4. Let b < 1. Fix t ≥ 0.
1. If x(t) > xˆ, then x(t+ 1) < x(t).
2. If x(t) < xˆ, then x(t+ 1) > x(t).
Lemma A.5. Let b < 1. Then, limt→∞ x(t) = xˆ.
B Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that since bi = 0, the opinion of node i at time t+ 1 is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) +
∑
j∈N(i)wijxj(t)
wii + di
(B.1)
where recall that di :=
∑
j∈N(i)wij is the weighted degree of node i. Let LG be the weighted
laplacian matrix of G. Recall that LG is given by
(LG)ij =

di, if i = j
−wij , if (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise
Now consider the vector LGx(t). The ith entry of the vector is given by
(LGx(t))i = dixi(t)−
∑
j∈N(i)
wijxj(t) = dixi(t) + wiixi(t)−
wiixi(t) + ∑
j∈N(i)
wijxj(t)

= (di + wii)(xi(t)− xi(t+ 1)) (from (B.1))
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Equivalently, in matrix notation,
x(t+ 1) = (I −DLG)x(t) (B.2)
where, D is a diagonal matrix such that Dii = 1/(di +wii). Note that since G is connected, di > 0,
and therefore Dii is finite. Consider the difference η(G,x(t + 1)) − η(G,x(t)). Observe that for a
vector y ∈ [0, 1]n, η(G,y) = y>LGy. Therefore, we have that
η(G,x(t+ 1))− η(G,x(t)) = (x(t+ 1))>LG(x(t+ 1))− (x(t))>LGx(t)
= (x(t))>(I −DLG)>LG(I −DLG)x(t)− (x(t))>LGx(t) (from (B.2))
= (x(t))> ((LG − LGDLG)(I −DLG)− LG) x(t) (since LG is symmetric)
= (x(t))> (LG − LGDLG − LGDLG − LGDLGDLG − LG) x(t)
= (x(t))> (LGDLGDLG − 2LGDLG) x(t)
= (x(t))>L>GD
1/2((D1/2LGD
1/2 − 2I))D1/2LGx(t) (since LG is symmetric)
= y>(D1/2LGD1/2 − 2I)y (where y := D1/2LGx(t))
Thus, in order to show that η(G,x(t + 1)) − η(G,x(t)) ≤ 0, it suffices to show that for all vectors
y ∈ Rn, y>D1/2LGD1/2y ≤ 2||y||22. We prove this as Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.1. Consider an arbitrary weighted undirected graph G = (V,E,w) over n nodes. Let
LG be the weighted laplacian matrix of G. Let D be an n × n diagonal matrix such that for i =
1, . . . , n, Dii = 1/(di +wii), where di =
∑
j∈N(i)wij is the weighted degree of i in G. Let y ∈ Rn be
an arbitrary vector. Then, y>D1/2LGD1/2y ≤ 2||y||22.
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , n, let ri := di + wii. Let P := D
1/2LGD
1/2. Then,
Pij =

di
ri
, i = j
−wij√
rirj
, (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise
Then, we have that
y>Py =
∑
i,j
Pijyiyj =
n∑
i=1
Piiy
2
i + 2
∑
(i,j)∈E
Pijyiyj =
∑
i
di
ri
y2i − 2
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij√
rirj
yiyj
=
∑
i
 1
ri
y2i
∑
j∈N(i)
wij
− 2 ∑
(i,j)∈E
wij√
rirj
yiyj
=
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
y2i
ri
+
y2j
rj
)
− 2
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij√
rirj
yiyj
=
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
yi√
ri
− yj√
rj
)2
= −
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
yi√
ri
+
yj√
rj
)2
+ 2
∑
i
di
ri
y2i
≤ −
∑
(i,j)∈E
wij
(
yi√
ri
+
yj√
rj
)2
+ 2
∑
i
y2i (since di ≤ ri)
≤ 2||y||22
18
Proof of Theorem 3. Let |S(t)| = k. Then, the opinion update (3.2) under the flocking process can
be written in matrix form as
x(t+ 1) = (1− )x(t) + A(t)x(t)
where A(t) is a n× n matrix given by
Aij(t) =

1
k , if i ∈ S(t), j ∈ S(t)
1, if i = j and i /∈ S(t)
0, otherwise
Observe that A(t) is doubly-stochastic. Then
γ(x(t+ 1)) = γ((1− )x(t) + A(t)x(t)) (by definition of x(t+ 1))
≤ (1− )γ(x(t)) + γ(A(t)x(t)) (since γ is convex in x)
≤ (1− )γ(x(t)) + γ(x(t)) (by Proposition B.1)
= γ(x(t))
Proposition B.1. γ(A(t)x(t)) ≤ γ(x(t)).
Proof. Let y := A(t)x(t). Since A(t) is doubly stochastic, it follows by a famous theorem by Hardy,
Littlewood and Polya, that x(t) majorizes y. Moreover, γ(x) is a convex symmetric function.
Therefore, it is a Schur-convex function. By definition, a function f : Rn → R is Schur-convex if
f(x1) ≥ f(x2) whenever x1 majorizes x2. Therefore, γ(y) ≤ γ(x(t)).
C Proof of Theorem 4
To prove the theorem, we begin by making three simple observations that hold for all b ≥ 0. The
first observation follows directly from the symmetry of nodes in each set V1 and V2.
Lemma C.1. Consider nodes i, j ∈ V such that either both i, j ∈ V1 or both i, j ∈ V2. Then for all
t ≥ 0, xi(t) = xj(t).
The next observation allows us to focus on only analyzing the equilibrium opinion of nodes in
V1.
Lemma C.2. Consider a node i ∈ V1 and a node j ∈ V2. Then, for all t ≥ 0, xi(t) = 1− xj(t).
Proof of Lemma C.2. By induction.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that the statement holds for some t ≥ 0.
Base case: The statement holds for t = 0 by assumption in the theorem statement.
We will now show that the statement holds for t+ 1.
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1) =
(xi(t))
b
(1− xi(t))b
si(t)
di − si(t) (C.1)
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where di = n(ps + pd) and, by Lemma C.1, si(t) = n(psxi(t) + pdxj(t)). On the other hand,
xj(t+ 1)
1− xj(t+ 1) =
(xj(t))
b
(1− xj(t))b
sj(t)
dj − sj(t) (C.2)
where sj(t) = n(psxj(t) + pdxi(t)), and dj = n(ps + pd) = di. By the induction hypothesis, we know
that xi(t) = 1− xj(t). It follows that Si(t) = di − sj(t). Substituting this into (C.1), we get
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1) =
(xi(t))
b
(1− xi(t))b
si(t)
di − si(t) =
(1− xj(t))b
(xj(t))b
dj − sj(t)
sj(t)
=
1− xj(t+ 1)
xj(t+ 1)
where the last equality follows from (C.2). It follows that xi(t+ 1) = 1− xj(t+ 1).
This completes the inductive proof.
Lemma C.2 implies that if we prove the theorem statement for nodes in V1, we get the proof for
nodes in V2 for free. So, in the rest of the proof, we only make statements about nodes in V1. The
third observation lower bounds the opinions of nodes in V1.
Lemma C.3. Consider a node i ∈ V1. For all t ≥ 0, xi(t) ∈ [12 , 1].
Proof of Lemma C.3. It is easy to see that for all t ≥ 0, xi(t) ≤ 1. We will prove that xi(t) ≥ 12 by
induction over t.
Base case: The statement holds for t = 0 by assumption in the theorem statement.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that the lemma statement holds for some t ≥ 0, i.e., assume that
xi(t) ≥ 12 for some t ≥ 0.
We will show that the lemma statement holds for t+ 1.
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1) =
(xi(t))
b
(1− xi(t))b
Si(t)
di − si(t)
≥ (xi(t))
b
(1− xi(t))b (since si(t) > di − si(t))
≥ 1 (since xi(t) ≥ 1
2
by the induction hypothesis, and b ≥ 0)
This implies xi(t+ 1) ≥ 12 , completing the inductive proof.
Recall that i’s opinion at time t+ 1 is given by
xi(t+ 1) =
(xi(t))
bsi(t)
(xi(t))bsi(t) + (1− xi(t))b(di − si(t)) (by (2.3))
where si(t) = n(psxi(t) + pd(1− xi(t))), and di = n(ps + pd). Now consider the equation
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) (C.3)
We will show that if b ≥ 1 or b < 2hG+1 , (C.3) has no solution in (12 , 1), whereas if 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 ,
there exists a unique solution to (C.3) in (12 , 1).
Lemma C.4. Consider a node i ∈ V1. Fix t ≥ 0.
(a) If b ≥ 1, for every xi(t) ∈ (12 , 1), xi(t+ 1) > xi(t).
(b) If 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , there exists a unique solution, say xˆ, to Eq.(C.3) in (12 , 1).
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(c) If b < 2hG+1 , for every xi(t) ∈ (12 , 1), xi(t+ 1) < xi(t).
Proof of Lemma C.4. Consider the function f : [0, 1]→ R defined as
f(y; b) :=

1, y ∈ [0, 1], b = 1
0, y ∈ [0, 1], b = 2
2
b − 1, y = 12 , b > 0
(y)2−b−(1−y)2−b
y(1−y)1−b−y1−b(1−y) , otherwise
(C.4)
We will first prove a few properties of f and then use those properties to prove Lemma C.4.
Proposition C.1. 1. For all b > 0, f is continuous over [0, 1].
2. If 0 < b < 1, f is strictly increasing over [12 , 1].
3. If b ≥ 1, for all y ∈ [0, 1), f(y; b) ≤ 1.
Proof. 1. Observe that f is continuous when b = 1 or b = 2. So, we only need to show that
f is continuous at y = 12 when b 6= 1 and b 6= 2. Let p(y; b) := (y)2−b − (1 − y)2−b and
q(y; b) := y(1 − y)1−b − y1−b(1 − y). Observe that when b 6= 1 and b 6= 2, both p and q are
differentiable on [0, 1]. For y ∈ [0, 1],
p′(y; b) = (2−b)(y1−b+(1−y)1−b); q′(y; b) = (1−y)1−b−(1−b)y(1−y)−b−(1−b)y−b(1−y)+y1−b
Therefore,
lim
y→1/2
p′(y; b)
q′(y; b)
= lim
y→1/2
(2− b)(y1−b + (1− y)1−b)
(1− y)1−b − (1− b)y(1− y)−b − (1− b)y−b(1− y) + y1−b =
2
b
− 1
(C.5)
So, we have that
lim
y→1/2
f (y; b) = lim
y→1/2
p(y; b)
q(y; b)
= lim
y→1/2
p′(y)
q′(y)
(using L’Hoˆpital’s rule) =
2
b
− 1 (from (C.5)) = f(1
2
; b)
Therefore, when b 6= 1 and b 6= 2, f is continuous at 12 .
2. Assume 0 < b < 1. Fix y1, y2 ∈ [12 , 1] such that y1 > y2. We will show that f(y1; b) > f(y2); b.
For conciseness of expression, define y¯1 := 1− y1 and y¯2 := 1− y2. Then
y1y2 − y1y¯2 > (y1y2)1−b − (y1y¯2)1−b (C.6)
Similarly,
y¯1y2 − y¯1y¯2 > (y¯1y2)1−b − (y¯1y¯2)1−b (C.7)
Adding (C.6) and (C.7), we get
y1y2 − y1y¯2 + y¯1y2 − y¯1y¯2 > (y1y2)1−b − (y1y¯2)1−b + (y¯1y2)1−b − (y¯1y¯2)1−b
Or equivalently,
(y1y2 − y¯1y¯2)−
(
(y1y2)
1−b − (y¯1y¯2)1−b
)
> (y1y¯2 − y¯1y2)−
(
(y1y¯2)
1−b − (y¯1y2)1−b
)
(C.8)
Moreover, since y1, y2 ∈ [12 , 1] and y1 > y2,
y1y2 − y¯1y¯2 > 0; (y1y2)1−b − (y¯1y¯2)1−b > 0; y1y¯2 − y¯1y2 > 0; (y1y¯2)1−b − (y¯1y2)1−b > 0 (C.9)
21
(C.8) and (C.9) imply that
y1y2 − y¯1y¯2
y1y¯2 − y¯1y2 >
(y1y2)
1−b − (y¯1y¯2)1−b
(y1y¯2)1−b − (y¯1y2)1−b
Rearranging, we get
(y1)
2−b − y¯12−b
y1y¯11−b − y1−b1 y¯1
= f(y1; b) >
(y2)
2−b − y¯22−b
y2y¯21−b − y1−b2 y¯2
= f(y2; b)
3. Since f is symmetric about y = 12 , we will prove the theorem for y ∈ [12 , 1). Fix y ∈ [12 , 1).
Observe that when b ≥ 1, (1− y)1−b ≥ y1−b (since y ≥ 1− y). Equivalently
y(1− y)1−b ≥ y2−b (C.10)
For the same reason,
y1−b(1− y) ≤ (1− y)2−b (C.11)
From (C.10) and (C.11), it follows that
y(1− y)1−b − y1−b(1− y) ≥ (y)2−b − (1− y)2−b
or equivalently, f(y; b) ≤ 1.
Using these properties of f we will prove Lemma C.4.
1. If b ≥ 1, then for all y ∈ [0, 1), f(y; b) ≤ 1 (by Proposition C.1) < hG. Therefore, for
y ∈ [12 , 1),
(y)2−b − (1− y)2−b
y(1− y)1−b − y1−b(1− y) < hG
⇔ y2−b − (1− y)2−b < hG(y(1− y)1−b − y1−b(1− y))
⇔ y2−b + hGy1−b(1− y) < (1− y)2−b + hGy(1− y)1−b
⇔ y1−b(y + (1− y)hG) < (1− y)1−b((1− y) + hGy)
⇔ y
1− y <
(
y
1− y
)b
· (1− y) + hGy
y + (1− y)hG
For y = xi(t), the right hand side of the last inequality above is equal to xi(t+1)/(1−xi(t+1)),
implying that xi(t+ 1) > xi(t).
2. If 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , then observe that f(12 ; b) = 2b − 1 ≤ hG < f(1; b) = ∞. Since f is a
continuous function (by Proposition C.1), therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there
must exist a yˆ ∈ [12 , 1) such that f(yˆ; b) = hG. Equivalently,
(yˆ)2−b − (1− yˆ)2−b
yˆ(1− yˆ)1−b − yˆ1−b(1− yˆ) = hG
Rearranging the above expression, we get
yˆ
1− yˆ =
(
yˆ
1− yˆ
)b
· (1− yˆ) + hGyˆ
yˆ + (1− yˆ)hG
Again, for yˆ = xi(t), we have that xi(t+ 1) = xi(t). The uniqueness of xˆ follows from the fact
that, by Proposition C.1, f is strictly increasing over (12 , 1].
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3. If b < 2hG+1 , then for all y ∈ [12 , 1], f(y; b) ≥ f(12 ; b) (by Proposition C.1) = 2b − 1 > hG. In
other words,
(y)2−b − (1− y)2−b
y(1− y)1−b − y1−b(1− y) > hG
Again, rearranging the above expression, we get
y
1− y >
(
y
1− y
)b
· (1− y) + hGy
y + (1− y)hG
Again, for y = xi(t), the right hand side of the last inequality above is equal to xi(t + 1),
implying that xi(t+ 1) < xi(t).
This concludes the proof of Lemma C.4.
Next we will prove Theorem 4 for the case of persistent disagreement, the cases of polarization
and consensus are limiting cases of that case as b → 1 and b → 2/(hG + 1) respectively. We will
show that when 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , the value xˆ defined in Lemma C.4(b) is a stable equilibrium. The
other two cases can be formally proven using an argument similar to the one below. Next we will
show that when 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , the sequence {xi(t)} is bounded.
Lemma C.5. Consider a node i ∈ V1. Let 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 . Let xˆ ∈ (12 , 1) be the solution to (C.3).
1. If x0 < xˆ, then for all t > 0, xi(t) < xˆ.
2. If x0 > xˆ, then for all t > 0, xi(t) > xˆ.
Proof of Lemma C.5. We will prove statement (1). Statement (2) can be proven using a similar
argument.
Proof by induction.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that the lemma statement holds for some t ≥ 0, i.e., assume that
xi(t) < xˆ for some t ≥ 0.
Base case: The statement holds for t = 0 by assumption.
We will show that the lemma statement holds for t+ 1.
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1) =
(xi(t))
b
(1− xi(t))b
si(t)
di − si(t) <
(xˆ)b
(1− xˆ)b
si(t)
di − si(t) (since
1
2
< xi(t) < xˆ, and b > 0)
Observe that since xi(t) < xˆ and ps > pd, si(t) = n(psxi(t) + pd(1 − xi(t))) < n(psxˆ + pd(1 − xˆ)).
Therefore,
si(t)
di − si(t) <
psxˆ+ pd(1− xˆ)
ps(1− xˆ) + pdxˆ
As a result,
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1) <
(xˆ)b
(1− xˆ)b
psxˆ+ pd(1− xˆ)
ps(1− xˆ) + pdxˆ =
xˆ
1− xˆ (by definition of xˆ)
This implies xi(t+ 1) < xˆ. This completes the inductive proof.
Next we will prove that when 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 , the sequence {xi(t)} is monotone.
Lemma C.6. Consider a node i ∈ V1. Let 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 . Let xˆ ∈ (12 , 1) be the solution to (C.3).
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1. If x0 < xˆ, the sequence {xi(t)} is strictly increasing.
2. If x0 > xˆ, the sequence {xi(t)} is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Lemma C.6. We will prove statement (1); statement (2) can be proven using a similar
argument.
Assume x0 < xˆ. Then, from Lemma C.5, we know that for all t ≥ 0, xi(t) < xˆ. Fix t ≥ 0.
Let xi(t) = y < xˆ. Recall that by definition of xˆ, if xi(t) = xˆ, xi(t + 1) = xi(t). Equivalently,
f(xˆ; b) = hG, where f is defined by (C.4). From Proposition C.1, we know that f is strictly
increasing over the interval (12 , xˆ). Therefore, f(y; b) < f(xˆ; b) = hG. Equivalently,
(y)2−b − (1− y)2−b
y(1− y)1−b − y1−b(1− y) < hG
Rearranging, we get
y
1− y <
(
y
1− y
)b
· (1− y) + hGy
y + (1− y)hG =
xi(t+ 1)
1− xi(t+ 1)
Equivalently, xi(t+ 1) > xi(t).
Using the fact that the sequence {xi(t)} is monotone and bounded, next we will prove that it
converges to xˆ.
Lemma C.7. Consider a node i ∈ V1. Let 1 > b ≥ 2hG+1 . Let xˆ ∈ (12 , 1) be the solution to (C.3).
Then, limt→∞ xi(t) = xˆ.
Proof. For the proof, we will assume that the initial opinion xi(0) = x0 ≤ xˆ. The case when x0 > xˆ
can be argued in an analogous way.
Observe that if x0 = xˆ, then by Lemma C.4, it follows that for all t ≥ 0, xi(t+ 1) = xˆ, and we
are done. So let us assume that 12 < x0 < xˆ. From Lemma C.5 and Lemma C.6, we know that the
sequence {xi(t)} is strictly increasing and bounded. This implies that the sequence must converge
either to xˆ or to some value in the interval [x0, xˆ). Consider the function g : [0, 1]→ R defined as
g(y) :=
yb(hGy + (1− y))
yb(hGy + (1− y) + (1− y)b(hG(1− y) + y) − y
Observe that for all t ≥ 0, xi(t+ 1)− xi(t) = g(xi(t)). Therefore,
(a) for all y ∈ (12 , xˆ), g(y) > 0 (since, by Lemma C.6, the sequence {xi(t)} is strictly increasing),
and
(b) g(xˆ) = 0 (by definition of xˆ).
For the purpose of contradiction, assume that limt→∞ xi(t) = a, where x0 ≤ a < xˆ. This implies,
for every  > 0, there exists a t() such that for all t ≥ t(), xi(t + 1) − xi(t) < , or equivalently,
that for all t ≥ t(), g(xi(t)) < .
Let miny∈[x0,a] g(y) = c. It implies for all y ∈ [x0, a], g(y) ≥ c. From (a), it follows that c > 0.
Setting  = c, our analysis implies the following two properties of g: (1) for all t ≥ 0, g(xi(t)) ≥ c,
and (2) for all t ≥ t(), g(xi(t)) < c, which contradict each other. This completes the proof by
contradiction.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
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D Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Theorem 6.
Lemma D.1. In the limit as n→∞, SimpleSALSA is polarizing with respect to i if and only if i
is biased.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that xi >
1
2 .
Let pr be the probability that SimpleSALSA recommends a RED book. The proof consists of
two steps: first we show that pr >
1
2 and pr ≤ xi, and then we show that if pr > 12 and pr ≤ xi,
SimpleSALSA is polarizing with respect to i if and only if i is biased.
pr =
∑
j∈V2:j2 is RED
P[i 3−→ j]
=
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
P[i 1−→ j1]
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j1
2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
P[i 1−→ j2]
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j2
2−→ j]
=
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j1
2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j2
2−→ j]
=
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j1
2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij2
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
P[j2
2−→ j]
=
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈N(j1)∩N(j)
1
|N(j1)|
1
|N(i′)| +
∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij2
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈N(j2)∩N(j)
1
|N(j2)|
1
|N(i′)|
=
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈V1
Zi′j1Zi′j
|N(j1)||N(i′)| +
∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij2
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈V1
Zi′j2Zi′j
|N(j2)||N(i′)|
By Lemma 5.1, in the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈V1
Zi′j1Zi′j
|N(j1)||N(i′)| → xi
1
k ·mk/2nn
mk2(14 + Var(x1))
n2
= xi
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
and∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈V2
j is RED
∑
i′∈V1
Zi′j2Zi′j
|N(j2)||N(i′)| → (1−xi)
1
k ·mk/2nn
mk2(14 −Var(x1))
n2
= (1−xi)
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
Therefore, in the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
pr → xi
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
+ (1− xi)
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
Since xi >
1
2 (by assumption), and Var(x1) > 0 (by assumption), we have that
pr >
1
2
and pr ≤ xi (D.1)
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First, assume that i is unbiased. Let p be the probability that i accepts the recommendation. There-
fore, the probability that the recommended book was RED given that i accepted the recommendation
is given by
prp
prp+ (1− pr)p = pr ≤ xi
Therefore, SimpleSALSA is not polarizing.
Now, assume that i is biased. This implies i accepts the recommendation of a RED book with
probability xi and that of a BLUE book with probability 1− xi. Therefore, the probability that the
recommended book was RED given that i accepted the recommendation is given by
prxi
prxi + (1− xi)(1− pr) >
prxi
prxi + pr(1− xi) (since pr >
1
2
, from (D.1)) = xi
Therefore, by definition, SimpleSALSA is polarizing.
Lemma D.2. In the limit as n → ∞ and as T → ∞, SimpleICF is polarizing with respect to i if
and only if i is biased.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that xi >
1
2 .
Let pr be the probability that SimpleICF recommends a RED book. For a node j ∈ N(i), let
qjRED be the probability that after T two-step random walks starting at j, the node with the largest
value of count(j), i.e., j∗, is RED, and qjBLUE be the corresponding probability that j∗ is BLUE. Then,
pr =
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
P[i 1−→ j1]qj1RED +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
P[i 1−→ j2]qj2RED
=
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
1
|N(i)|qj1RED +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
1
|N(i)|qj2RED
=
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|qj1RED +
∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij1
|N(i)|qj2RED
Consider T two-step random walks starting at a node j1 ∈ N(i). Observe that qj1RED is exactly the
probability that after these T random walks, there exists a RED node, say j, such that count(j) >
count(j’) for all BLUE nodes j′. However, as T →∞,
P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, count(j) > count(j’)] = P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, P[j1 2−→ j] > P[j1 2−→ j′]]
since as T →∞, count(j)→ T · P[j1 2−→ j] (by the Strong Law of Large Numbers). Therefore,
qj1RED = P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, P[j1 2−→ j] > P[j1 2−→ j′]]
Observe that for two RED books j1 and j,
P[j1
2−→ j] =
∑
i′∈N(j1)∩N(j)
1
|N(j1)|
1
|N(i′)| =
∑
i′∈V1
Zi′j1Zi′j
|N(j1)||N(i′)|
By Lemma 5.1, in the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
P[j1
2−→ j]→ 1
k
1
mk/2n
mk2(14 + Var(x1))
n2
=
1
n
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
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Similarly, for a BLUE book j′, in the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
P[j1
2−→ j′]→ 1
k
1
mk/2n
mk2(14 −Var(x1))
n2
=
1
n
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
Since Var(x1) > 0, in the limit as n → ∞, P[j1 2−→ j] > P[j1 2−→ j′] with probability 1. Therefore,
qj1RED = 1. By symmetry qj2RED = 1 − qj2BLUE = 0. Moreover, by Lemma 5.1, in the limit as
n→∞, ∑ j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)| = xi, with probability 1. Therefore, as n→∞,
pr = xi (D.2)
The rest of the analysis is identical to Lemma D.1.
This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 5. Assume, without loss of generality, that xi >
1
2 .
Let pr be the probability that SimplePPR recommends a RED book to i. This probability is
exactly equal to the probability that after T three-step random walks starting at i there exists a
RED node, say j, such that such that count(j) > count(j’) for all BLUE nodes j′. However, as
T →∞,
P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, count(j) > count(j’)] = P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, P[i 3−→ j] > P[i 3−→ j′]]
since as T →∞, count(j)→ T ·P[i 3−→ j] with probability 1 (by the Strong Law of Large Numbers).
Therefore,
pr = P[for all BLUE books j′ ∈ V2, P[i 3−→ j] > P[i 3−→ j′]]
For a RED book j ∈ V2,
P[i 3−→ j] =
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
P[i 1−→ j1]P[j1 2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
P[i 1−→ j2]P[j2 2−→ j]
P[i 3−→ j] =
∑
j1∈N(i)
j1 is RED
1
|N(i)|P[j1
2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈N(i)
j2 is BLUE
1
|N(i)|P[j2
2−→ j]
P[i 3−→ j] =
∑
j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)|P[j1
2−→ j] +
∑
j2∈V2
j2 is BLUE
Zij2
|N(i)|P[j2
2−→ j]
As we showed in the proof of Lemma D.2, in the limit as n→∞,
P[j1
2−→ j]→ 1
n
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
and (by symmetry) P[j2
2−→ j]→ 1
n
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
with probability 1. Moreover, by Lemma 5.1, in the limit as n → ∞, ∑ j1∈V2
j1 is RED
Zij1
|N(i)| → xi, with
probability 1. Therefore, with probability 1,
P[i 3−→ j]→ xi
n
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
+
1− xi
n
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
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Similarly, for a BLUE book j′ ∈ V2, in the limit as n→∞, with probability 1,
P[i 3−→ j′]→ xi
n
(
1
2
− 2Var(x1)
)
+
1− xi
n
(
1
2
+ 2Var(x1)
)
Since xi >
1
2 and Var(x1) > 0,
P[i 3−→ j] > P[i 3−→ j′]
with probability 1. In other words, pr = 1. So, the probability that a book recommended by
SimplePPR was RED given that it was accepted is exactly pr regardless of whether i is biased or
unbiased. Therefore, SimplePPR is polarizing.
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